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Private Enforcement of International Human Rights Laws:
Could a Small Church Group Successfully Combat Slavery in
the Sudan?
Amanda Bixler"
State-to-state enforcement is the paradigmatic method of punishing a state's
violations of public international law. However, in the face of international political
complexities, private citizens must sometimes undertake the heavy task of ensuring
international legal protection for themselves. The recent situation in Sudan is one
such example. Because of the need for Sudan's help in the war against terrorism, the
United States is temporarily unable to pursue the usual means of enforcing anti-
slavery mandates against Sudan's Khartoum government. A group of private citizens
has thus decided to make an attempt at reparation by striking at a private entity that it
sees as central to the evils it has endured-a Canadian oil company. Might this type of
private enforcement prove successful on a large scale in combating entrenched human
rights violators, untouchable by traditional government action? To what extent should
private citizens be enforcers of international law? Were they envisioned as such under
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), and other
such documents?
This development will illustrate how private enforcement-though perhaps
nontraditional-may be one of the most successful methods of ensuring compliance
with human rights laws, especially in the midst of international political pressures.
And though it may seem a functionally dangerous practice to invite large-scale private
litigation in politically tenuous times, private enforcement of international rights
norms has long been contemplated by the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), and
more recently, the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"). Although the UN
Charter and the UDHR do not provide private causes of action, more recently
adopted instruments, such as the TVPA, reflect the modern need for greater
flexibility in methods of international legal enforcement. In the Sudan, private
enforcement may be the only way for private citizens subjected to slavery to achieve
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any sort of remuneration, at least as long as the United States continues to need the
assistance of the Sudanese government.
Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that "[t]here is perhaps no greater
tragedy on the face of the earth today than the tragedy that is unfolding in the
Sudan."1 Sudan, Africa's largest state, is one of only two nations in the world currently
recognized as engaged in the practice of traditional slavery. The United Nations
Children's Fund ("UNICEF") estimates that Sudan has between ten and fourteen
thousand slaves, while groups active in redemption efforts estimate that the number
approximates one hundred thousand.2 In fact, "the accusation is made that slave-
trading is done by government-backed, armed militias" while the government looks
the other way, to compensate the militias for fighting in the nation's fifty-year civil
war.' Allegations also abound regarding Sudanese involvement in non-traditional slave
activities, such as forced prostitution and forced labor. Traditional slavery is clearly in
violation of international law, and some theorists reason that these non-traditional
practices may also be categorized as violations of the international law of human
rights.4 However, slavery is an extremely profitable enterprise; one estimate puts the
profit from human trafficking as high as $7 billion worldwide.! And when a foreign
government gains astronomically from the institution of slavery-be it directly or
indirectly-and simultaneously denies its very presence, perhaps out of reputational
concerns, it will likely be difficult for the international community to institute formal
anti-slavery measures.
However, the international community has certainly tried to halt the practice of
slavery in the Sudan. During the past five years, the United States government has
worked in conjunction with the United Nations to stop the atrocities in the Sudan
and to help the Islamic Khartoum government reach a peace agreement with the rebel
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army ("SPLM/A"). In 1997, the UN
extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights to monitor the situation in the Sudan and to report to the General Assembly
1. Authorizing Appropriation for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 for the Department of State and the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, and for Other Purposes, Hearing before the House Comm on International Relations and
the Subcomm on International Operations and Hunan Rights, 107th Cong 1st Sess 356 (2001) (statement
of Secretary of State Colin Powell), available online at <http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/intlrel/hfa71262.000/hfa71262_0f.htm> (visited Oct 2, 2002).
2. Jon Sawyer, Sudan Agrees to Let US-Led Panel Look into Slavery Charges; Inquiry Could Begin as Early as
Next Month, St Louis Post-Dispatch A12, A13 (Dec 16, 2001).
3. See "We're Not a Terrorist State," Says Khartoutn's Ambassador, Africa News (Nov 19, 2001).
4. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res No 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, 183d mtg
at 71, UN Doc No A/RES/217 A (III) (1948); Slavery Convention, 212 UNTS 17 (1926);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS
212 (1969). See also the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 266 UNTS 3 (1956).
5. See PanAfrica, What Have Governments Done to Stop Slavery, Africa News, 7 (Dec 7, 2001).
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on the human rights situation in the Sudan.6 And in September 2001, President Bush
appointed former Senator John Danforth as special envoy to the Sudan to promote
peace and discuss the preservation of human rights in the area.7
Perhaps most significantly, Congress initiated legislation in 1999 known as the
Sudan Peace Act, which, if enacted, would impose economic sanctions on Sudan for
continued human rights violations and which would prohibit "the facilitation ... of the
exportation ... of goods, technology, or services from Sudan ... [and] the performance
by any United States person of any contract ... in support of an industrial,
commercial ... or governmental project in Sudan."8 This provision would be
particularly detrimental to foreign oil companies invested in Sudan, from which the
Khartoum government receives approximately $2 million per day.9 The concern is
that the demand for oil promotes the interests of those involved in the slave trade; the
UN's most recent draft resolution on human rights, for example, indicates that the
utilization of oil in Sudan has led to "coercive displacements" of individuals living in
oil-rich areas (by which it means the introduction of these individuals into the slave
trade).0 Sudanese officials have opposed similar regulations in the past on the ground
that they compromise Sudan's national sovereignty; in short, the government
maintains that Sudan "[has] every right to utilize the natural resources of its
country."" Some, however, have remained determined to limit foreign investments in
the nation, especially investments that lead to oil exploration and production.
An additional provision to the Sudan Peace Act, added by the House, would
have limited the operation of foreign oil companies in Sudan to an even greater
extent-namely, it would forbid any company that is doing business with Sudan from
participating in US capital markets. 2 This version of the bill passed the House of
Representatives with a 422 to 2 majority, 3 and a joint Senate-House conference
6. See Situation of Humnan Rights in the Sudan, UN Commission on Human Rights Res 1993/60, UN
Doc No E/CN.4/RES/1993/60 (1993); Situation of Hunan Rights in the Sudan, GA Res No 140,
UN GAOR, 52d Sess, 70th plen mrg, UN Doc No A/RES/52/140 (1997).
7. Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, UN Commission on Human Rights Res 1993/60 (cited in
note 6). See also Special State Department Briefing Re: The Situation in Sudan, Federal News Service
(Nov 27, 2001).
8. S 1453, 106th Cong. 2d Sess § 2 (1999) (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by House), available
at <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/cl06query.html> (visited Sept 14, 2002). Different versions of the
Sudan Peace Act were passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate prior to September
11th. The bill was then tabled, in response to a request issued by President Bush. In November,
after two months' delay, it was reopened for consideration in the House.
9. Nat Hentoff, Sudan: Our Terrorist Comirade, Village Voice 34 (Dec 25, 2001).
10. Id.
11. See UN: Third Committee Approves Eight Draft Resolutions on Human Rights, Right to Development,
Globalization, Iran, Sudan, M2 Presswire 43 (Dec 3, 2001).
12. Paul Basken, US House Resumes Action on Sudan Sanctions Measure, Bloomberg News 3 (Nov 15,
2001).
13. Id. See also Hentoff, Sudan: Our Terrorist Conmrade, Village Voice at 34 (cited in note 9).
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committee was to be called to debate the inclusion of the capital markets provision.1 4
It appeared that strong measures were finally being taken to strike at the heart of
slavery and mistreatment in Sudan. That was before September 11th.
According to US officials, in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks,
"Sudan responded cooperatively 'across the board' to U.S. requests for specific
information (regarding terrorism] and actions, making an 'implicit' offer of access to
military bases and overflight rights, and providing names and locations of individuals
in the Al Qaeda network, as well as access to Sudan's banking system."" Because of
Khartoum's cooperation, the US officially made Sudan part of the international
"coalition against terrorism," and on September 20th, President Bush officially
requested that Congress put aside any further work on the Sudan Peace Act.'6
Although Bush stated in November that "the actions and policies of the Government
of Sudan continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States," he requested a postponement of
Congressional deliberations, leaving little incentive for US or foreign companies
invested in Sudan to suspend oil production.7
As a result of the current dearth of formal governmental regulation against
foreign oil investments in the Sudan, private groups have begun to seek their own
source ofjustice. On November 8, 2001, a group of private Sudanese citizens brought
a $1 billion class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against
Talisman Energy, a Canadian oil company.18 Initiated pursuant to the ATCA, the
lawsuit charges the company with violating international laws against slavery, torture,
and the treatment of civilians during conflict. The lawsuit has been brought on behalf
of "anyone suffering injuries and losses because of Talisman in or within 50 miles of
the company's concession area in the Sudan."9 The potential for such a suit is
incredible. If it succeeds, the allegedly illegal recruitment activities undertaken by the
Khartoum government-which were primarily aimed at gaining the support of
foreign oil money-will lose all effectiveness. By striking at the profit center currently
14. Basken, US House Resumes Action on Sudan Sanctions Measure, Bloomberg News 2 (cited in note 12).
15. Africa and the War on Global Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Africa of the House Comm on
International Relations, 107th Cong 17-22 (2001) (statement ofJ. Stephen Morrison, PhD, Director,
Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies), available online at
<http://www.house.gov/international-relaions/76191.pdf> (visited Oct 2, 2002).
16. See US Pressure Groups Urge Tough Line on Khartoum, Africa News (Nov 23, 2001). See also Hentoff,
Sudan: Our Terrorist Comrade, Village Voice at 34 (cited in note 9).
17. President George W. Bush, Continuation of National Emergency with Sudan: Message fron the President
of the United States 3 (Nov 5, 2001) available online at <http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
enforcemenr/ofac/presdocs/sudanOl.pdf> (visited on Sept 16, 2002).
18. See The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc, No 01 CV 9882 (AGS) (SDNY filed
Nov 8, 2001).
19. Ruth West, The Price of a Barrel of Oil? A Few Lives, New Statesman 36 (Jan 14, 2002) (internal
quotation omitted).
cO 1 3 NO. 2
Trivate Enforcement of lnternationaf--fuman lkt hts Laws
fueling the practice of slavery in the area, private citizens may achieve what public
institutions have not yet been able to-an end to the slave trade in Sudan.
Private groups have long sought to effect political change or ensure redress for
violations of international law in the absence of adequate state-level judicial or
enforcement mechanisms, particularly in the human rights arena. One theorist
summarizes: "Given the apparent unwillingness of common law countries (like the
United States] to initiate criminal prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction,
civil suits have become an important vehicle for victims of human rights abuses to
enforce international law and obtain legal redress."" There are several federal statutes
in the US that explicitly contemplate private enforcement of international human
rights laws including: the ATCA, the TVPA, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, and
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").2' The Presbyterian Church of Sudan
filed suit pursuant to the ATCA, the most frequently invoked federal statute
authorizing private enforcement of international human rights.'
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a case that also relied on the ATCA, was brought over two
decades ago in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 The facts in Filartiga
were very similar to the facts in the Talisman case; a number of private non-US
citizens brought suit against a private person (in Filartiga, a government official),
alleging that the torture perpetrated by that individual violated international law. In
its amicus curiae brief, the United States government stated that torture, which is
largely analogous to slavery, is unlawful under many multilateral treaties as well as
under customary international law. 4 The government further stated that "a refusal to
recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the
credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human rights ....
[P]rivate enforcement is entirely appropriate."'2 More recent cases initiated under the
ATCA have been brought against private corporations. Similarly, private suits against
foreign corporations have been brought under the TVPA since its inception in 1994.
Thus, it appears that at least where there is statutory authority to privately
enforce international law, both the US court system and the US government are
amenable to allowing such enforcement. Van Schaack embraces the idea as well, citing
20. Beth van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Hunan Rights Norms in the
Context of the Proposed HagueJudginents Convention, 42 Harv Ind LJ 141, 149 (2001).
21. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1994); The Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub L
No 102-256, 106 Star 73 printed after the ATCA at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); The Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1990, 18 USC § 2331-39 (1994) and Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 USC § 1330
(1994) (containing an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for human rights violations). Van
Schaack, 42 Harv Intl LJ at 142 (cited in note 20).
22. Van Schaack, 42 Harv Intl LJ at 150 (cited in note 20).
23. Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
24. United States: Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Filartiga v Pena-Irala, No 79-6090, reprinted in 19 ILM 585, 595-601 (1980).
25. Id at 604.
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a lack of other "effective and accessible" vehicles for human rights enforcement than
state action.2 However, there is no other case that raises an issue with economic
ramifications as strong as the Talisman case. Although the Sudan is not one of the
world's primary oil producers, it is a significant player. Further, the defendant in this
case is not an ex-government official from Paraguay; it is a large Canadian corporation
with strong commercial ties to the US. If the proposed class action is permitted to
continue, it may have vast and wide-ranging effects on foreign relations and
international commerce, much more than any private enforcement suit that our court
system has faced in recent history.
Perhaps in contemplation of similar cases with similar effects, "delegations from
forty-five countries are in the process of drafting the Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("the Hague Convention")
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law." ' The
proposed Convention, if successful, would seek to bolster international enforcement
via greater compliance with judgments among signatories, while imposing stricter
limitations on the exercise of certain bases of personal jurisdiction in those states. In
other words, it "will create the foundation for an extensive enforcement regime that
will enable plaintiffs litigating in Contracting States to seek enforcement of their civil
judgments in any Contracting State in which the defendant holds assets," and it will
also "regulate the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts in a way that affects cases
seeking civil reparations for violations of human rights norms.... [Cjases seeking civil
damages brought on the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be foreclosed in the
courts of states that ratify the proposed Convention." For example, van Schaack
states that an individual victimized in Country A that flees to Country B, such that
she could normally file suit in B's courts, would be prohibited from seeking civil
reparations in B if both A and B were parties to the Convention, even if the potential
defendant maintained significant contacts in Country B. Instead, the individual would
need to return to Country A and file suit there. These are exactly the facts of the
Talisman case. But how can we expect these individuals to return to a country where
they were oppressed as slaves in order to bring suit against an entity they believe to be
instrumental in their oppression? One can easily see the conundrum-this
Convention might significantly restrict plaintiffs' abilities to file multi-billion dollar
suits against private organizations in an attempt to make an end-run around state
governments. Thus, a key avenue for private enforcement of human rights violations
may effectively be closed.
There have been no resolutions made in this area to date; thus far, individual
enforcement remains a viable mechanism for punishing human rights offenders. Many
26. See van Schaack, 42 Harv Intl LJ at 143 (cited in note 20).
27. Id at 141.
28. Id at 171.
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argue that it is, in fact, a necessary enforcement mechanism. In short, because
"[ijnstitutions based on the U.N. Charter, international multilateral treaties, or
regional agreements typically address state responsibility and norm compliance but do
not assign liability to individual defendants, generate enforceable remedies, or provide
victims with a judicial forum in which to bear witness and confront their abusers,"
private enforcement of international norms in domestic courts allows a serious hole in
international law to be filled."
But while some theorists argue that private enforcement of international human
rights laws is perfectly justifiable-in fact, explicitly legal under domestic law, if not
international treaty-the issue will continue to be hotly debated. Others reason that,
functionally, private enforcement will prove an aberration in the realm of international
law. In the Sudan, for example, multi-billion dollar suits such as Talisman may be
successful in driving out oil investors, and may thus cut down significantly on the local
slave trade. However, they might be equally effective in driving the newly destitute
Khartoum government into the arms of terrorists in efforts to receive funding.
Considerations such as these have led the international community to reexamine its
willingness to accept more liberal conceptions of private enforcement, as evidenced by
the Hague Convention. Whether this will be more harmful to the cause of human
rights enforcement, or will instead increase the stability of international commerce,
remains to be seen.
29. Id at 161.
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